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Abstract 
Canadians are living longer and retiring younger. When combined with the aging of the 
baby boom generation, that means that the “inactive” portion of the population is 
increasing and there are concerns about possibly large increases in the burden of 
support on those who are younger. We model the impact of continued future gains in life 
expectancy on the size of the population that receives public pension benefits. We pay 
special attention to possible increases in the age of eligibility and the pension 
contribution rate that would maintain the publicly financed component of the retirement 
income security system. 
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Introduction 
Canadians today are living longer than ever before, and in apparent better health. Even 
so, the typical age of retirement is much lower than it was only a few decades ago. But 
Canada is not alone in that regard. As noted in a recent OECD report, “It is indeed 
remarkable that, despite increases in longevity, the effective age at which workers retire 
has tended to follow a downward trend in virtually all OECD countries, at least until 
recently.” (OECD, 2009, p 10)  
Since 1966, when the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans came into being, life 
expectancy has increased by about ten years for men and eight for women. If such 
gains are not reflected in a lengthened period at work, the fraction of life spent in 
retirement must increase, and that is what has happened. More time in retirement, 
especially when combined with the aging of the baby boom generation and its imminent 
transition from work to retired status, means that the “inactive” portion of the population 
is increasing. That has given rise to concerns in policy discussions about possibly large 
increases in the burden of support that will fall on those who are younger, and 
significant inequities across generations if they have to pay substantially more than did 
their parents or grandparents to maintain the first two pillars of the public retirement 
income security system in Canada, namely Old Age Security (OAS), together with the 
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), and the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans 
(CPP/QPP).  2 
 
In what follows we explore (using a simplified but relevant model) the impact that 
continued future gains in life expectancy will have on the size of the population eligible 
for public pension benefits. In doing so we give special attention to possible increases in 
the age at which people are eligible to receive benefits and consider the impact on the 
size of the future labour force, the changing ratio of population of working age or labour 
force to retired population, and the pension contribution rate that would be required to 
maintain the publicly financed component of the retirement income security system. 
 
Life Expectancy and Age of Retirement: The Historical Record  
It is estimated that over the course of the 20
th century life expectancy at birth in Canada 
increased by about 30 years for males and 32 for females (Statistics Canada, 1999, 
2006). Similar gains have been experienced in other developed countries over the last 
160 years, and Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) argue forcefully that social policy should be 
based on the assumption that such gains will continue into the future.
1 We agree. 
 
Social policies affect the age at which people retire, partly by fixing the “normal age of 
retirement”, and thereby affecting expectations and planning on the part of individuals 
and their employers. Economic theory suggests that rising income levels may be 
important also – that individuals may choose to spend a larger share of their lifetimes in 
leisure activities (including retirement) as incomes rise – but the institutional 
arrangements that they face, including the age at which they are eligible to receive 
pension benefits, are likely to be important also, and we focus on them. 3 
 
Age 65 was legislated as the age of eligibility for full CPP/QPP benefits in 1966 and is 
often referred to as the normal age of retirement. However, that age has been the 
"normal" retirement age in the Canadian retirement income system since 1951.
2 A 1979 
report observed that the choice of 65 as the normal age was greatly influenced by the 
decision made in 1934 in the US that 65 would be “the minimum retirement age in 
public and private pension plans” (Senate of Canada, 1979, p 21).  
In 1966 less than 70 percent of males could have expected to reach age 65
3; that 
increased to almost 87 percent by 2010 (estimate by the authors). Furthermore, those 
who retired at 65 in 1966 could have expected to live another 13.6 years, based on 
Statistics Canada life table calculations, while those who retired at the same age in 
2010 could expect another 17.9 years (estimate by the authors). Thus later cohorts not 
only had a better chance of living to the normal age of retirement, but they could also 
expect more years of retirement. More specifically, comparing 2010 with 1966, 26 
percent more males survived to 65 and a typical male who retired at that age would 
have 32 percent more years of (expected) retirement. 
 
The Population Outlook in Canada 
Table 1 reports estimated values for the population at mid-year 2010, when those born 
during the baby boom were (as a close approximation) in the age range 44 to 64.
4 Thus 
those at the leading edge of the baby boom generation were just about to reach their 
65
th birthdays. The table shows also the population 44 years earlier, in 1966, when the 4 
 
baby boomers were in their youth. Between those two dates the 65 and older 
component more than tripled in size.  
Two projections are shown for 2035, by which time all surviving members of the boom 
generation will be 69 or older, or well past 65.
5 Both projections make what we term 
standard assumptions with respect to fertility and immigration – namely, that the total 
fertility rate remains at its most recently recorded level of 1.66 births per woman, that 
gross immigration remains at 250 thousand per year, and that emigration remains at 
0.12 percent of the population. The projections differ only in terms of the assumption 
made about future reductions in mortality, and hence gains in life expectancy. 
The first projection assumes, unrealistically, that there will be no further declines in 
mortality rates after 2010. The second assumes that mortality rates will continue to 
decline in accordance with historical experience. In particular, it assumes that the age-
specific annual rates of change of mortality observed over the 30-year period ending in 
2001
6 will continue unabated until 2035. With that assumption, life expectancy rises 
from the 2010 level by 3.9 years for males, 3.3 for females.
7 
A comparison of the two projections for 2035 shows how important a role future gains in 
life expectancy will play in determining the size of the population, and especially its 
older component.  With continued gains in life expectancy, the projected overall 
population increases by 7.5 million – almost 1 million more than if there were no such 
gains. Furthermore, the bulk of the gains occur at older ages: they add 4.6 people 65 
and over for every additional person under that age. With continued gains in life 
expectancy the population 65 and over is projected to account for 24.0 percent of the 5 
 
total population in 2035 (rather than 22.6 percent if life expectancy were constant), up 
from 14.1 percent in 2010. The population 65 and older will grow by 108 percent while 
the under-65 population will grow by only 8 percent. 
 
Retirement Age Policies in Other OECD Countries 
Canada stands out among the OECD countries in not having in place explicit plans to 
increase the age of eligibility for public pension plan benefits, thereby encouraging more 
years of work and a later age of retirement. In part that might be explained by the 
success that Canada has had in reducing poverty at older ages while keeping costs 
relatively low (Myles, 2000). In any event, pension reform is high on the political 
agenda, with commissioned reports received in 2008 by the Governments of Alberta 
and British Columbia (jointly) and Ontario, and, in 2009, by the Governments of Canada 
and of Nova Scotia
8 and the federal government’s public consultation on the retirement 
income system.
9 However the focus of those reports is on how to deal with apparent 
shortcomings in coverage and adequacy in relation to the privately financed (third pillar) 
component of the system, and most especially with employer pension plans. There has 
been very little discussion of the age of eligibility. (An exception is Hering and Klassen, 
2010). 
The US is the leader in giving attention to age of eligibility. Legislation that was enacted 
in 1983 but that took effect only 20 years later has gradually raised the age for full social 
security benefits. That age was increased by two months each year for five years, 
starting in 2003, and reached 66 in 2008. Starting in 2020 it will increase by a further 6 
 
two months each year until it reaches 67, in 2025.
10 Changes have taken place also in 
other major OECD countries, and further changes are expected. Germany will increase 
the normal pension age from 65 to 67 between 2012 and 2029 and reduce the benefits 
associated with early retirement at age 63 (ibid, p 91). Under current legislation, by 
2020 the age for full state pension benefits in the UK will increase to 65 for women, from 
its current 60, and the age for both men and women will increase from 65 to 68 over a 
22 year period, starting in 2024. However, the legislation is under review, and the 
Financial Times reported “the likelihood that [the state pension age] would reach 70 by 
the middle of the century”.
11 France has increased the number of contribution years for 
public sector workers from 37.5 to 40 by 2012; thereafter “the minimum contribution 
period to reach a full pension [is] to increase in line with gains in life expectancy, so that 
the ratio of period of pension payment to the working period remains constant” (OECD, 
2009, p 194); it has also reduced early retirement benefits and it proposes to raise the 
early retirement age from 60 to 62 by 2018 and the age at which workers are entitled to 
full pension benefits from 65 to 67.
12 By 2008 the normal pension age in Italy was 65 for 
men and 60 for women (ibid, p 216), with those ages to evolve in line with gains in life 
expectancy (EC, 2010, p 30); furthermore, the age at which early retirement benefits 
(so-called “seniority pensions”) can be claimed was increased from 57 to 58 in 2008 and 
is scheduled to increase further, to 61, by 2013 (OECD, 2009, pp 217-18). The age is 
gradually being increased also in Japan, from 60 to 65, for the earnings-related 
component of pension benefits, with the full adjustment to be complete by 2030 (ibid, p 
280).  7 
 
Reforms are underway in other countries as well.
13 Increases in the age of eligibility for 
early retirement or reductions in benefit amounts have been legislated or proposed in 
Belgium (from 58 to 60 by 2012), Denmark (from 60 to 62 between 2019 and 2022), and 
Finland (from 63 to 65 between 2011 and 2022). Increases in the age of eligibility for full 
pension benefits have been legislated or proposed in Australia (from 65 to 67 between 
2017 and 2023), the Czech Republic (to 65 by 2030), Denmark (from 65 to 67 between 
2024 and 2027, linked to life expectancy thereafter), Hungary (from 62 to 65, starting in 
2012), the Netherlands (from 65 to 67 in 24 monthly steps), Switzerland (for women, 
from 63 to 64; men stay at 65), and Turkey (from 58 for women and 60 for men to 65 for 
both by 2048). Still others -- Finland, Portugal, and Sweden -- have linked benefits to 
gains in life expectancy. In contrast, in Canada no change in the age of pension 
eligibility is in prospect at this time. 
 
Age-Eligibility for Public Pension Benefits: A Simple Model with Relevance to Canada 
We employ the following simple model to explore (in broad terms) the effects of 
changes in the eligibility for benefits in the Canadian pension system. Let    ,   be the 
population of age   in year   and assume a public pension system in which the age of 
eligibility for benefits in year   is     . The number of age-eligible beneficiaries in year   
is then ∑    ,          . If the age of eligibility is constant, such that          , then 
the number of eligible beneficiaries is simply the total population of age   or older. In 
the present Canadian context    might be taken (as an approximation) to be 65. 8 
 
Suppose though that as a matter of public policy the age of eligibility is allowed to 
increase, subject to the restriction      1  –         1, for all  . (The restriction 
implies that all persons who were eligible in year t will still be eligible in year t+1.) The 
age of eligibility thus becomes a policy tool for partially controlling the number eligible, 
and hence the cost of operating the system. 
The model with age of eligibility set at 65 is an oversimplification of the Canadian 
system, but captures its main features in respect of the effects of population aging on 
pension costs, and the possibilities for influencing those costs by choice of the age of 
eligibility. We explore these possibilities in a series of calculations below. First, though, 
some observations on the nature of the approximation – on aspects of the Canadian 
pensions system that are ignored by the model. 
The approximation is close for OAS. To be eligible for the OAS pension an individual 
living in Canada must be 65 or older, must be a Canadian citizen or legal resident at the 
time the application is approved, and must have lived in Canada for at least ten years 
after turning 18. Someone living outside Canada may also be eligible if he/she was a 
Canadian citizen or a legal resident of Canada on the day before leaving the country 
and had lived in Canada for at least 20 years after turning 18. These restrictions mean 
that some members of the population of Canada (defined on a census basis) who are 
65 or older will not qualify for OAS and some people who do not belong to the Canadian 
population (again, on a census basis) will qualify. As a practical matter, though, these 
exceptions are of minor importance, and the population 65 and over is a close 
approximation to the population eligible, under present legislation.
14  9 
 
 The approximation is not quite as close for the other major component of the Canadian 
system, the CPP/QPP. The CPP/QPP is contributory, and to qualify for benefits one 
must have worked for some or all of the time since the age of 18. Contributions are paid 
in part by employers and in part by employees, and subsequent benefits are related to 
the history of earnings levels and years of employment. A benefit recipient must make 
application, must be 65 or older or, subject to certain restrictions, between 60 and 64. 
There is no upper age limit on when benefits may begin but after age 70 the pension is 
frozen at the age-70 level so there is no financial incentive to delay receipt beyond that 
age. There is provision for survivor benefits to continue after the death of a pensioner. 
Some other conditions apply as well. Thus the age range and scope for CPP/QPP 
pension recipients is not as closely approximated by the model as it is for OAS 
recipients. In practice some CPP/QPP recipients will be younger and some older than 
65, and (as with the OAS), some will be outside the country. But again we view the 
population 65 and older as a reasonable approximation for the eligible population under 
the present Canadian system, and hence a reasonable starting point for the exploratory 
projections that follow. 
 
Alternative Policy Measures for Canada 
Using the model described above, we consider nine projections that differ in terms of 
the assumptions about the age at which people are entitled to receive public pension 
benefits. That is, we project the size of the age-eligible population in Canada under 
each of these assumptions. All projections assume continued gains in life expectancy. 10 
 
In all projections it is assumed, consistent with the practice in Canada, that the same 
age of eligibility (AE) applies to both men and women. (As noted earlier, that is not true 
in some countries.) In the first projection, AE0, the legislated age of eligibility remains 
unchanged at 65. AE1 assumes instead that that age increases by one month each 
year, starting in 2011, and continues until 2035, by which year it reaches 67. AE2 
assumes that the age of eligibility is increased in the same way, but starting five years 
later, in 2016; in consequence, by 2035 it reaches 66.5 years. The next two projections, 
AE3 and AE4, assume that the transition occurs more rapidly – by three months each 
year instead of one – but that the increase ceases when age 70 is reached. AE1 
through AE4 are modelled loosely on the changes that occurred in the United States, 
starting in 2003. AE5 assumes that increases adjust to reflect fully any gains in life 
expectancy at birth, starting in 2011. The final three projections, AE6 through AE8, 
assume that the increase takes place more rapidly still – by one year of age for each 
year of time – starting in 2011 for AE6, in 2016 for AE7, and in 2021 for AE8. Again, 
increases cease at age 70.  For convenience of reference the age-of-eligibility 
assumptions in the projections are summarized as follows: 
•  AE0  -- remains at 65 
•  AE1  -- increases by one month each year from 2011 to 2035 
•  AE2  -- increases by one month each year from 2016 to 2035 
•  AE3  -- increases by three months each year from 2011 to 2030 
•  AE4  -- increases by three months each year from 2016 to 2035 
•  AE5  -- increases adjust fully to gains in life expectancy at birth, from 2011 
•  AE6  -- increases by one year each year from 2011 to 2015 11 
 
•  AE7  -- increases by one year each year from 2016 to 2020 
•  AE8  -- increases by one year each year from 2021 to 2025 
The first results of the projections are reported in Table 2. The upper panel shows the 
size of the age-eligible population in 2035 under each of the alternative assumptions, 
and also in 1966 and 2010, for comparison. It is evident that allowing age to adjust can 
make a large difference. By 2035 the number projected to be eligible increases by as 
little as 59 percent (in projections AE3, AE4, and AE6 through AE8, when only those 
age 70 and older are eligible) or by as much as 108 percent (in AE0, when those 65 and 
over are eligible). 
The lower panel shows the age-eligible population as a percent of the overall 
population. How much the proportion age-eligible to receive benefits will increase is 
quite sensitive to changes in the age of eligibility. If the current age requirement were to 
remain in place (AE0) the eligible population is projected to account for 24.0 percent of 
the total population by 2035. However, if the age were to adjust by one month per year, 
starting in 2011 (AE1), the eligible population would account for only 21.6 percent of the 
total, and somewhat more if the change were to take effect five years later, in 2016 
(AE2). 
The impact is greater in AE3 and AE4, in both of which the age of eligibility increases to 
70;  the age-eligible population in each of those cases increases less than half as much 
by 2035 – from 14.1 to only 18.3, as compared to 24.0 if the eligible age were to remain 
at 65. The same is true of AE6, AE7, and AE8, in all of which the age of eligibility is 70 
in 2035. Finally, when the adjustment reflects gains in life expectancy, in AE5, the 12 
 
increase in the age of eligibility is less, and hence the increase in the eligible proportion, 
to 19.9, is somewhat greater. 
While five of the projections show the same results for 2035, the time paths of the 
adjustments differ considerably one from another, and from the other four projections. 
That is shown in Figure 1. As would be expected, the sooner an increase in the age of 
eligibility takes effect, and the larger that increase, the greater the impact on the number 
eligible. Thus, as shown in the upper panel of the figure, the entire time path of AE1 lies 
below that of AE2, and the path of AE3 lies below that of AE4 until age 70 is reached. 
The increase is somewhat greater if the adjustments reflect gains in life expectancy, as 
in AE5. Projection AE3 is especially noteworthy: the relatively rapid increase in the age 
of eligibility that continues until 2030 results in only a modest increase in the age-eligible 
proportion until after that date.  
In all these cases the fraction of the population that is age-eligible increases year by 
year. The increase itself is an inevitable consequence of the sheer size of the baby 
boom but it is evident that the extent of the increase can be attenuated, in greater or 
lesser degree, by on-going age adjustments. 
The paths of adjustment are rather different for the last three projections in the set of 
nine, as shown in the lower panel of Figure 1. AE6, AE7, and AE8 each involve a much 
more rapid adjustment in the size of the age-eligible population. If the age of eligibility 
were to increase from 65 to 70 in one-year increments each year, starting in 2011 
(AE6), the age-eligible proportion would decline sharply, from 14.1 percent in 2010 to 
10.6 percent in 2015, at which time it would be almost 6 percentage points below the 13 
 
no-adjustment case. The proportion would then increase steadily thereafter, running 
roughly parallel to the no-adjustment case. The adjustment would be delayed by five 
years (AE7) or ten (AE8) in the other two cases, but all three projections end up with 
18.3 percent of the population age-eligible. Policy makers are not likely to find such 
rapid early adjustment to be appealing, and so we drop AE6, AE7, and AE8 from further 
consideration. 
Focusing then on projections AE0 to AE5, Table 3 reports the implications for the 
expected amount of time spent in retirement for someone who retires at the age of 
pension eligibility. Two measures are provided. One is the expected proportion of adult 
life (i.e., after age 20) spent in retirement; the other is the expected number of years of 
working age for each year in retirement.  
Life expectancy at age 65 in 2010 is estimated at 17.9 years for males and 21.4 for 
females. Retirement at age 65 after 45 years in the working age range would mean that 
a man would expect to have 28.5 percent of his adult life in retirement while a woman 
would expect to have 32.2 percent. Also shown in Table 3 is what those proportions 
would be in 2035 under each of the projections. If 65 were to remain the age of eligibility 
(AE0), both men and women retiring at that age would expect to spend an increased 
share of their lives in retirement in 2035 – up by 2.4 percentage points since 2010 for 
men, 2.3 for women. Increasing the age of eligibility would imply a smaller fraction in 
retirement in 2035; it could still be somewhat greater than it was in 2010 (AE2) or it 
could be less (all other projections). In any event, we observe that all of the increases in 
the age of pension eligibility considered here would result (for people retiring at that 14 
 
age) in a larger fraction of life spent in retirement in 2035 than was the case in 1966, 
when the CPP and QPP were introduced. 
The alternative measure in Table 3, in the bottom panel, is the number of years of 
working age for each year of retirement. As compared to 2010, there would be a 
reduction of about one-quarter of a year by 2035 for men if age 65 were retained (AE0), 
or an increase of up to five-eighths of a year otherwise (AE3-4). The impact for women 
would be somewhat less. As compared to 1966, on the other hand, there would be 
fewer years of work for each expected year in retirement in all cases. 
Population aging implies an increase in the proportion of older people and one might 
expect the actual labour force (not just the “working age” population) to become smaller 
in relation to the size of the older population. That is, one would expect there to be 
fewer people in the labour force “to provide support” for those in old age. Table 4 shows 
the size of the labour force in 1966, 2010 (estimated), and projected to 2035 (upper 
panel), and the corresponding ratios of labour force to the age-eligible population (lower 
panel). The 2035 labour force projections are based on one of two assumptions – either 
the participation rates remain constant (at 2009 levels, the latest ones observed at the 
time of writing) or else they adjust to reflect increases in the age of eligibility for benefits. 
In the latter case the assumption is a shift of the age pattern of participation for those 
aged 55 and older: a one-year increase in the age of eligibility results in those aged 56 
having participation rates previously associated with those 55, in those 57 having rates 
previously associated with those 56, and so on. (This shift in age profile is assumed to 
apply at every age 55 and over, including both ages below the age of eligibility and ages 
above.) 15 
 
With 2009 participation rates maintained, the labour force is projected to grow by only 8 
percent between 2010 and 2035, as compared to 108 percent growth in the population 
65 and over. However, when participation rates adjust, the labour force grows by as 
much as 22 percent over the same period (it does that in projections AE3 and AE4). A 
larger labour force means a higher ratio to the population eligible to receive benefits. 
That ratio, which can be thought of as a type of “support ratio” for pension recipients, 
was 3.9 in 2010, down from 4.9 in 1966. If the age of eligibility does not change and 
labour force participation rates are unchanged also, the ratio is only 2.0 by 2035. If the 
eligibility age adjusts and participation rates do not, the support ratio declines by less. 
(The smallest reduction is from 3.9 to 2.7.) If participation rates adjust as well, the 
decline is smaller still.  
Figure 2 shows how the support ratios change year by year throughout the projection 
period. In the upper panel the assumption again is that participation rates remain 
constant; in the lower panel the rates are assumed to adjust. Both panels show 
sustained declines in all projections. The decline is greatest when the age of eligibility 
remains at 65 and participation rates do not adjust (the ratio falls steadily, from 3.9 to 
2.0). The decline is reduced when the age of eligibility adjusts and, to a lesser extent, 
when participation rates adjust. AE3 is noteworthy in that the support ratio is highest 
throughout the projection period, the result of a rapid and early starting increase in the 
age of eligibility. By 2030, when the age of eligibility reaches 70, the ratio in that 
projection falls to 3.0 if participation rates do not adjust, and to only 3.4 if they do.  
 16 
 
Implications for Pension Contribution Rates 
We think of our model of public pension eligibility as pertaining (as an approximation) to 
the OAS and CPP/QPP in the Canadian context. OAS benefit payments are made 
entirely from general revenues of the federal government. The CPP and QPP operate 
separately, but in parallel, and are financed by employer and employee contributions. 
(They have maintained the same contribution rates and similar benefit structures from 
the inception of the two plans.) The contribution rates have been adjusted over time, but 
have always been set high enough to generate an inflow of contributions in excess of 
the outflow of benefits and, in consequence, both have accumulated assets in separate 
funds. However, neither plan comes close to being “fully funded”.
15 As an exercise, we 
calculate the overall contribution rate that would be needed each year in order to pay 
the combined total OAS and CPP/QPP benefits that would be claimed in that year. That 
is equivalent to financing the public pension system on a strictly pay-as-you-go basis, 
although in fact the actual financing of the Canadian system is only partly pay-as-you-
go. Although differing from the actual financing, the pay-as-you-go calculation gives an 
indication of the economic burden of the model pension plan (and by implication, the 
OAS and CPP/QPP), and the effects of changes in demographic structure. 
In our stylized pay-as-you-go system the total of public pension benefits paid each year 
is equal to the product of  , the average benefit payment, and  , the number receiving 
benefits. As a convenience in the calculations that follow, we relate the contributions to 
finance the system to the total earnings in the economy, the product of the average 
annual wage per member of the labour force,   (assuming a positive wage for the 17 
 
employed or self-employed, zero for the unemployed), and the number in the labour 
force,   . The contribution rate can then be calculated for each year   as 
                   ⁄ . If, as we assume, the ratio of average benefit to average wage is 
maintained (implying that future benefits are fully wage-indexed), and the rate of 
unemployment is fixed, the equation can be rewritten as                ⁄  ,  where 
     /   , a constant for every year  . With the benefit-wage ratio fixed, the required 
contribution rate varies directly with the ratio of the number of beneficiaries to the 
number in the labour force. 
In what follows we approximate the benefit-wage ratio at 0.25
16 and take account of 
changes in the ratio of pension-eligible population to labour force to calculate the 
contribution rate. The results are shown in Figure 3. The upper panel once more is 
based on the assumption that labour force participation rates do not change; the lower 
panel assumes that they adjust to gains in life expectancy, as in the earlier calculations.  
It is evident from the figure that changing the age of eligibility would have a significant 
impact on the contribution rate, under pay-as-you-go financing. If the age were to 
remain at 65 the rate would have to double, from 6.4 percent in 2010 to about 12.3 by 
2035. The increase would be about 1.2 percentage points less if there were a one-
month-per-year increase in the age of eligibility, starting in 2011 (AE1), and 2.1 
percentage points less if the age adjusted to the projected gains in life expectancy 
(AE5). The increase would be smaller still – about 2.9 percentage points less – if the 
age of eligibility were increased to 70 (AE3, AE4). If, in addition, participation rates were 
to adjust to reflect policy changes in the age of pension eligibility, the contribution rate 18 
 
needed by 2035 would be reduced by as much as an additional one percentage point. 
Put differently, if the age of eligibility were increased by three months each year until it 
reached age 70 in 2030, as in AE3, and participation rates adjusted, the contribution 
rate that would be needed to sustain the pension system would increase from 6.4 
percent in 2010 to only 7.3 percent in 2030. By comparison, with no change in the age 
of eligibility the contribution rate would be 11.6 percent in that year. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
As the baby boom generation retires over roughly the next two decades the fraction of 
the population eligible to receive public pension benefits will increase sharply. That 
would happen even without on-going reductions in mortality rates and the resultant 
increases in life expectancy. However, reductions in mortality mean that the impact will 
be even greater, especially if no offsetting adjustment is made to the age at which 
people are eligible to receive benefits. 
The age at which people are eligible for public pension benefits, and the age at which 
they retire, have figured prominently in recent discussions of pension reform in other 
countries, but in Canada they have been given little attention. And yet, as we have 
demonstrated, continued gains in life expectancy, when not accompanied by an 
extension of working life, result in increasingly large fractions of the human life span 
being spent in retirement. While from an economic theoretical point of view that might 
be regarded as simply a voluntary leisure/work substitution it gives rise to concerns 19 
 
about prospective increases in public pension costs and the level of support expected of 
the post-baby-boom generations.  
 
We have illustrated the quantitative importance of continued gains in life expectancy for 
the relative size of the future population. We have suggested that gradual and modest 
increases in the age of eligibility for the benefits that are available from public pension 
plans would serve two important purposes. First, they would moderate the inevitable 
decline in the size of the labour force relative to the size of the retired population. 
Secondly, they would make possible a reduction in the contribution rate (more 
generally, the rate of taxation, broadly defined) that would be needed to maintain the 
public component of the retirement income system. Most other developed countries 
have acted already but it is not too late for Canada to benefit from a review of its 
policies in respect of public pension age-eligibility. 
                                            
Endnotes 
 
∗ A preliminary version of this paper was presented at a conference of the International Council for 
Canadian Studies, Montreal, May 2010. We thank Martin Hering for comments on an earlier draft 
and Christine Feaver for comments and for the preparation of all tables and figures. We are grateful 
to SSHRC for its support of the SEDAP (Social and Economic Dimensions of an Aging Population) 
Research Program under the terms of its Major Collaborative Research Initiative 
 
1  In related work, Denton and Spencer (1999, 2002) consider the demographic impact of keeping 
the marker of “old age” fixed over extended periods when life expectancy is increasing. 
 
2  That claim is made on the website of Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, 
http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/lp/spila/wlb/aw/26retirement_legislative.shtml, accessed May 14, 2010. 
 
3 The 1966 estimates reported in this paragraph are the average values in 1961 and 1971 as 
reported in the standard (period) life tables for Canada for 1960-62 and 1970-72; see Dominion 
Bureau of Statistics (1963, 1974). 
 
4 A conventional, though somewhat arbitrary, dating of the baby boom period is from 1946 to 1966. 
 
5 The projections are based on the use of MEDS; see Denton, Feaver, and Spencer (2005). 
 
6  The year 2001 is the latest year for which official life tables are available from Statistics Canada.  20 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 
7  We observe that the projected gains in life expectancies would be greater, and more in line with 
what Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) would expect, if they were based on observed reductions in 
mortality over a longer historical period.  
 
8 Alberta and British Columbia – Joint Expert Panel on Pension Standards (2008)  
   Ontario – Expert Commission on Pensions (2008) 
   Canada – Mintz (2009) 
   Nova Scotia – Pension Review Panel (2009) 
 
9 The consultation documents are available at http://www.fin.gc.ca/activty/consult/retirement-
eng.asp, accessed September 21, 2010. 
10  http://www.ssa.gov/retire2/retirechart.htm, accessed May 10,  2010. 
11   http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cdcae644-7f72-11df-9973-00144feabdc0.html, accessed August 9, 
2010. 
 
12  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6199c1aa-79a7-11df-85be-00144feabdc0.html, accessed Sept 9, 2010. 
 
13  The changes described in this paragraph and the one following are drawn from OECD (2009). 
 
14  We note that originally only those 70 and over received benefits under the Old Age Security Act, 
which took force in 1952. Through later legislation a reduction in the age of eligibility from 70 to 65 
was phased in between 1965 and 1969; see 
http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/isp/oas/oasoverview.shtml accessed August 24, 2010. We 
note also that more than one-third of OAS beneficiaries, those with sufficiently low incomes, also 
receive GIS benefits, but we are not concerned here with GIS eligibility, as distinct from OAS 
eligibility. 
 
15  Given the benefit structure, the intention is that the current employer plus employee contribution 
rate (now set at 9.9 percent of contributory earnings) will allow a sufficient accumulation of assets 
in the near term such that the rate will not have to be increased in the longer term. This so called 
steady-state financing is designed “to build a reserve of assets equivalent over time to about five 
and a half years of benefit expenditures or about 25 percent of Plan liabilities” (Office of the Chief 
Actuary, 2007, p 9).  
 
16  That value closely approximates the recent average OAS plus CPP/QPP annual benefit payment 
relative to the average industrial wage. 21 
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RatioFigure 3: Pension Contribution Rate (Percent of Wage Bill) Under Pay-as-You-Go Financing,


































%Table 1: Impact of Continued Gains in Life Expectancy on the Size and Age Distribution of the Canadian
             Population
  <65 65+ All ages <65 65+ All ages
1966 18,475 1,540 20,015 92.3 7.7 100.0
2010 29,313 4,799 34,112 85.9 14.1 100.0
2035
 -- No gains in life expectancy 31,439 9,199 40,638 77.4 22.6 100.0
 -- Continued gains 31,607 9,978 41,584 76.0 24.0 100.0
Note: The values for 2010 and 2035 are projected using MEDS; see Denton, Feaver and Spencer (2005).
          With "no gains" in life expectancy, the mortality rates at all ages remain at their estimated 2010
          levels; for males that means life expectancy at birth of 78.6 years, for females 83.4 years. With 
          "continued gains", mortality rates continue to decline throughout the projection period at the same
          average annual percentage rates as those observed over the 30-year period ending in 2001.
 
Population size ('000) Percent distributionTable 2: Population Age-Eligible for Pension Benefits, Alternative Projections
 AE0 AE1 AE2 AE3 AE4 AE5 AE6 AE7 AE8
1966 1,540 1,540 1,540 1,540 1,540 1,540 1,540 1,540 1,540
2010 4,799 4,799 4,799 4,799 4,799 4,799 4,799 4,799 4,799
2035 9,978 8,991 9,186 7,612 7,612 8,288 7,612 7,612 7,612
1966 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7
2010 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1
2035 24.0 21.6 22.1 18.3 18.3 19.9 18.3 18.3 18.3
Note: See text for description of alternative projections.
Age-Eligible Population ('000s)
Age-Eligible Population / Total Population (%)Table 3: Life Expectancy, Age of Pension Eligibility, and the Proportion of Adult Life in Retirement for
              People Retiring at the Age of Eligibility, Alternative Projections
 
2035
1966 2010 AE0 AE1 AE2 AE3-4 AE5
Life expectancy at birth
  Males 68.8 78.6 82.5 82.5 82.5 82.5 82.5
  Females 75.2 83.4 86.7 86.7 86.7 86.7 86.7
Age of eligibility 65.0 65.0 65.0 67.1 66.7 70.0 68.6
Percent of adult life spent in retirement
  Males 23.2 28.5 30.9 27.3 28.9 24.2 26.3
  Females 27.1 32.2 34.5 31.0 32.5 28.0 30.0
Expected years of working age relative to years of retirement 
  Males 3.31 2.51 2.24 2.66 2.46 3.13 2.81
  Females 2.69 2.10 1.90 2.22 2.08 2.58 2.34
Note: See text for description of alternative projections.Table 4: Labour Force, Total and Relative to Age-Eligible Pension Population, Alternative Projections
 AE0 AE1 AE2 AE3-4 AE5
Labour Force ('000s)
1966 7,609 7,609 7,609 7,609 7,609
2010 18,679 18,679 18,679 18,679 18,679
2035
 -- Participation rates constant 20,255 20,255 20,255 20,255 20,255
 -- Participation rates adjust 20,255 21,339 21,122 22,866 22,129
Labour Force / Age-Eligible Population
1966 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9
2010 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9
2035
 -- Participation rates constant 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.4
 -- Participation rates adjust 2.0 2.4 2.3 3.0 2.7
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